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Hindu Conceptions of Law
By LuDo RocHER*

I

NY DISCUSSION of Hindu conceptions of law has to start
with the basic observation that nowhere in the Hindu tradition is there a term to express the concept of law, neither
in the sense of ius nor in that of lex. Not until the arrival of the

colonial powers was the concept of law used on the subcontinent,
by Europeans and through the medium of European languages. It
was not until 1772, the year in which it was decided that, "in all suits
regarding inheritance, marriage, caste, and other religious usages or

institutions," the Hindus should be governed by their own laws, that
an effort was made to study and translate the Sanskrit books in which

the Hindu laws were codified.

These books happen to be the dhar-

maidstras, treatises on dharma. Hence, the equation established by

the Western editors and translators of these books was dharma i.dstra
equals lawbook, code, or Institute.
2
tion: dharma equals law.

They also established the equa-

To be sure, Indians have followed this well-established practice. 3

When it comes to expressing the concept of law in modern India
through the medium of modern Indian languages, however, different
0 Professor of Sanskrit; Chairman, Department of South Asia Regional Studies,
University of Pennsylvania. Doctor of Laws 1950, Ph.D. 1952, Ghent (Belgium).
Corresponding member, Belgian Royal Academy of Overseas Sciences, 1964-; Fellow,
Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1971-. Editor and translator of Sanskrit legal treatises.
Author, Bibliographic du droit hindou ancien (1965) and other books and monographs
on Hindu law and Indology.
1. Plan for the Administration of Justice Extracted from the Proceedings
of the
Committee of Circuit (Cossimbascar) 15 August, 1772. (B. K. Acharyya, Codification
in British India, Calcutta 1914, p.153).
2. E.g., INsn'ruTEs OF HmIu LAw, OR THE OnANCES OF MANU (W. Jones
trans. 1794); THE INsTrruTEs OF M~Au (G. C. Haughton ed., trans. 1825); Lois DE
MANOU (A.L. Deslongchamps ed., trans. 1830-33); YXJKAVALxYAS GESETZBUCH (A.
F. Stenzler ed., trans. 1849); THE OaRDNANcEs OF MANU (A.C. Burnell trans. 1884);
THE LAws OF MAuu (G. Biihler trans. 1886); THE CODE OF MA-U (J. Jolly ed. 1887).
3. See, e.g., G. JHA, THE LAWS OF MANu. Jha began publishing this translation
in 1920.
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terms are used. For instance, recent dictionaries of India's official
language, Hindi, normally give two terms for law, one borrowed from
the Arabic-Persian (Muslim) tradition, kdnfin, and one from the Sanskrit (Hindu) tradition, vidhi. In addition, when the Indian Constitution was translated into Hindi, vidhi 4 became the official translation
for law, both in the text of the Constitution and in the English-Hindi
wordlist published along with it by the Government of India.
The reason why modem Indian languages looked for different
terms to express law may, at least in part, have been due to the fact
that, in the meanwhile, they had all accepted dharma as the Indian
equivalent for another concept imported from the West-religion. It
is not quite clear when and by whom dharma was first used in the
restricted sense of religion. One thing is sure, however, it represents
a conscious effort to find, for a category that had no equivalent in
India, a word from the Indian vocabulary which, even though it was
not perfectly identical, came at least closer than any other available
term.
Dharma and Law
After the above introductory remarks, this Article will now attempt to interpret the data as they emerge from the Hindu tradition.
The pivot of the entire system is dharma, which is neither religion nor
law, and yet crucial for the topic of this Article-the Hindu conceptions of law. Dharma has been rightly described as "one of those
Sanskrit words that defy all attempts at an exact rendering in English
or any other tongue." 5 It is therefore essential to approach it from
within the Hindu tradition, and describe how classical Hinduism itself understood it.
Dharma" is a noun formed with the suffix 'ma 7 from a root dhar
or dhr. The root expresses actions such as to hold, bear, carry, main4. Vidhi is a traditional term, meaning "injunction," referring to those sections
of the Vedas that contain actual rules rather than other sections that are merely explanatory.
5. 1 P.V. KANE, HISTORY OF DHARMASASTRA 1 (rev. ed. Poona 1968) [hereinafter cited as KANE). Kane's monumental work, in five volumes, is the principal
sourcebook on dharma and law. Volume 3, addressing Hindu law, appeared in 1946.
6. For studies on dharma, see Rocher, Bibliographie du droit hindou ancien in
INTRODUCTION

BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE

A L'HISTOIRE DU DROIT ET A LETHNOLOGIE JURIDIQUE

(J. Gilissen ed., Brussels 1965); L.

STERNBACH, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DHARMA AND ARTHA

IN ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL INDIA

(Wiesbaden 1973).

7.

Compare -men in Latin carmen, -ma in Greek rheuma.
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taiu, preserve, keep. Hence, dharma is the way in which, or the
means by which, one holds, bears, carries, or maintains, and, in accordance with semantic development common in Sanskrit, it means not
only the way of doing these things, but also the way of doing them.
Dharma, then, is the way in which one ought to hold, bear, carry, or
maintain. On a cosmic level, dharma is the way in which one maintains everything, the way in which the cosmos or the balance in the
cosmos, is maintained. At the micro level, dharma is the way in
which every constituent element of the cosmos contributes its share
to maintaining the overall balance. Each element has its own dharma, its svadharma. As long as each element of the cosmos performs
its specific svadharma, the overall balance does not suffer. As soon
as an element, however, deviates from its own dharma, that is, commits adharma, the balance is disturbed.
Theoreticians of dharma will, of course, insist on the fact that
every cosmic element has its svadharma. The sun is supposed to rise
in the morning and to set at night; water-the rains-has to arrive at
a set time of the year and disappear at another set time. In practice,
however, Hindus have primarily paid attention to the dharma of human beings. Each individual human being has a svadharma, which
is determined essentially by two factors: belonging to one of the
four stages of life (is&rama); and belonging to one of the four social
classes (varna). From these two factors comes the expression,
varnasramadharma.
For a better understanding of the Hindu conception of law, one
characteristic of the human dharma deserves to be pointed out above
all. A person's dharma regulates all activities, whatever their nature.
The dharma ordains when the individual shall awaken, how that person shall divide the day, and when the person shall retire at night.
The dharma rules a person's diet, quantitatively and qualitatively. The
dharma, of course, regulates the human's relationship to the supernatural powers, and prescribes the rituals and ceremonies by which
these relations shall be sustained; it therefore deals with the Hindu's
religion. Dharma also governs the individuars relations with fellow
people; it rules social contacts, many aspects of which belong to the
field of law. To put it differently, Hindu law is, together with every
other aspect of a Hindu's activities, part of Hindu dharma. Hindu
rules of law are to be found in the dharmaidstras,but these texts also
contain a variety of other rules which have little or nothing in common with law.
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A first important consequence of the concept of dharma is that,
in Hinduism, law, religion, and all other topics dealt with in the
dharma~dstras are inextricably intertwined. All attempts to disentangle the various categories and to label particular concepts or institutions as essentially religious or essentially legal, are bound to force
upon them categorizations which are foreign to the Hindu way of
thinking.
An example is the implication, in classical Hinduism, of committing what Western society would call a crime: killing a human being;
more specifically, killing a member of the highest class, a Brahmin.
Not to complicate the description, this examination shall restrict itself
to quoting from a single text, the dharmasastraattributed to Manu.8
First,9 killing a Brahmin is ranked among the four great sins, mahMpdtaka. Subsequently,'0 punishment for great sins is said to be corporal punishment: in the specific case of killing a Brahmin," the
brand of a headless corpse on the offender's forehead. This rule
is followed by a number of social implications:
Excluded from all fellowship at meals, excluded from all sacrifices, excluded from instruction and from matrimonial alliances,
abject and excluded from all religious duties, let them wander
over (this) earth.
Such (persons) who have been branded with (indelible)
marks must be cast off by their paternal and maternal relations,
and receive neither compassion nor a salutation; that is the teaching of Manu. 12
The text continues that corporal punishment 13 may be replaced by
the highest fine, if the killer at the same time performs a variety-too
long to enumerate here-of intricate penances described in great detail
elsewhere in the text. 14 Manu then 5 makes the usual distinction
between the case in which the crime was committed by a Brahmin and

8. 25 THE SACRED Booys OF THE EAST (F.M. Muller ed., G. Biihler trans. 1886)
[hereinafter cited as MANUI.
For editions and translations of the texts, see bibliographies cited in note 6, supra.
9. MANU, supra note 8, at 9.235.
10. Id. at 9.236.
11. Id. at 9.237.
12. Id. at 9.238-239.
13. Id. at 9.240.
14. Id. at 11.73-87, 90.
15. E.g., at 9.241-42.
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by someone belonging to a lower class; the former has to be less
severely punished than the latter. Finally, in another chapter, the
text describes the fate of the killer of a Brahmin in the next rebirth:
"The slayer of a Brahmana enters the womb of a dog, a pig, an ass,
a camel, a cow, a goat, a sheep, a deer, a bird, a Canddla, and a
Pukkasa."16
In short, killing a Brahmin was a transgression of dharma, with
all the consequences thereof. The transgression implies a criminal
element requiring puishment by the king, an element of sin to be
expiated by performing penances, and an element of exclusion from
one's usual social circles. It is also to be noted that the Hindu penal
code is strongly influenced by the caste system. For the same offense
a member of a lower class is more severely punished than one of a
higher class (a Brahmin is totally exempt from any kind of corporal
punishment), with the correlative provision that, for the same offense, punishment is higher or lower depending on whether the victim is of a higher or lower class. Also, Hindu crime extends beyond
this life, and is linked to the theory of rebirth.
The extent to which private law was interwoven with other categories cannot be better illustrated than by referring to some of the
difficulties which the British judges were to experience when they
were called upon to apply the dharma texts as legal codes in the
Anglo-Hindu law courts. They soon came to the conclusion: "All
those old text-books and commentaries are apt to mingle religious and
moral considerations, not being positive laws, with rules intended for
positive laws."17

No matter how much they were concerned not to

interfere with the religious beliefs of the Hindus-a concern that is
expressed over and again in the law reports-they decided that "the
Courts are to enforce only rules of positive law and not religious or
moral precepts."' 8
One of the simplest applications of this position concerns the
validity of adoption. The Sanskrit texts clearly require that, for an
adoption to be valid, a particular ritual, called dattahoma, has to be
performed. The question arose, whether or not the dattahoma was
a legal prerequisite for adoption, the legal character of which was, of
course, never doubted. The dilemma was described as follows:
16. Id. at 12.55.
17. Rao Balwant Singh v. Rani Kishori, 25 I.A. 54, 69 (1898).
18. S.V. GuPTE, HINDU LAW IN BRIsH INDIA 49 (2d ed. Bombay 1947).
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In certain circumstances the point might be the subject of a
prolonged and very conflicting argument, as the authorities, ancient and modern, are not in accord on the point as to whether
this is a legal as well as a religious requisite. There is a danger,
on the one hand, of not paying due respect to those religious
rites which are observed and followed among large classes of
Indian belief, while, on the other hand, the danger must also be
avoided of carrying these, except when the law is clear, into the
legal sphere, so as to affect or impair personal or patrimonial
rights. 19
The result was that, in Anglo-Hindu courts, the legal act, adoption,
was separated from the religious act, dattahoma, and that the former
20
was held valid without the latter.
Another, more complex, example involves both adoption and inheritance. The dharma texts forbid adoption of an only son. Vasistha, 21 for instance, allows the father to give, sell, or abandon his son,
but adds the proviso, "let him not give or receive (in adoption) an
only son."2 2 In a case that was to become very influential, the Privy
Council reiterated their view that one should not "take for strict law
precepts which are meant to appeal to the moral sense," 23 and decided that the adoption of an only son is not null and void under the
Hindu law.
Although the dharma texts rarely exhibit justification for their
statements, the rationale of Vasistha's rule is clear. The text is obviously concerned about the fate of the natural father who becomes
deprived of his only son. The son is, of course, the natural heir of his
father. At the same time, however, he is much more than that; he
frees his father "from his debt to the Manes,"' 24 and, after the father's
death, he is the only person capable of performing the ritual, called
sraddha,which is required for the father to join the ranks of his ancestors. This example not only explains why an only son should not
be the object of an adoption; it also shows that what we call inheritance in Hinduism involves far more than the legal rights to an estate.
19.

Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit, 42 I.A. 135, 148-49, (1915).

20.

MAYNE'S TREATISE ON HINDU LAW AND USAGE

238-39 (11th ed. N. Chandra-

sekhara Aiyar, Madras 1950).
21. VASiS.THA 15.2, in 14 THE SACRED BooKs OF THE EAST (F.M. Muller ed., G.
Biihler trans. 1882) [hereinafter cited as VASISTHA].
22. Id. at 15.3.
23. 26 I.A. 113, 136 (1899).
24. MANU, supra note 8, at 9.106; VASISTH1A, supra note 21, at 11.48.
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The Privy Council became acutely aware of the scope of Hindu
inheritance when they were faced with a murderer claiming the estate of his victim. The Council stated:
Before this Board it has been contended that the matter is governed by Hindu Law, and that the Hindu Law makes no provision disqualifying a murderer from succeeding to the estate of
his victim, and therefore
it must be taken that according to this
25
law he can succeed.
It was seen earlier that the Hindu dharma does not condone murder.
On the contrary, it is both a crime and a sin. The problem confronting
the Privy Council lies elsewhere: who are, according to the dharma,
those who are disqualified from succeeding to an estate, and, more
importantly, what is the underlying justification? Manu has the following enumeration: "Eunuchs and outcasts, (persons) born blind
or deaf, the insane, idiots and the dumb, as well as those deficient in
any organ (of action or sensation), receive no share." 26 Murderers
are not among them. Those listed in the text as "incompetent to
receive a share" are individuals who are unable to administer it, and,
also, to perform for the deceased the necessary funeral rites. In this
case, the Privy Council decided to overrule Hindu law: "The alternative is between the Hindu law being as above stated or being for
this purpose non-existent, and in that case the High Court have rightly
decided that the principle of equity, justice and good conscience ex' 27
clude the murderer."

Sources of Law
Another consequence of the Hindu concept of dharma is that
law shares its basic features with religion and all other categories
treated in the dharma6&stras. To illustrate this point this Article will
first present a brief description of these texts, and then it will examine
the characteristics of their contents generally and their legal materials
in particular.

25.

Kenchava v. Girimallappa Channappa, 51 I.A. 368, 372-73 (1924).

26. MAu, supra note 8, at 9.201.
27. Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, states: "A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting
the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder."

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9

The source materials for our knowledge of classical Hindu dharma
are primarily the dharmasittrasand dharma&stras. Although the latter term is also used collectively for both kinds of texts, the principal
difference is that the sfitras are older, and composed in the succinct
and often enigmatic prose style used in many other branches of Hindu
learning (such as Yogasfitras, Veddntas-ftras, and Pdnini's grammatical siitras). The most important dharmasfitras are those attributed
to Gautama, Apastamba, Vasistha, and Baudhdyana.2 8 They may
29
have been composed between 600 and 300 B.C.
The more recent dharmasastrasare in verse, in the typical thirtytwo syllable distichs called Vloka or anustbh, which are characteristic
not only of the Sanskrit epics but also of learned treatises in many
fields such as medicine and architecture.3"
Closely related to the dharmas'dstrasare the epics and the Purd.nas. Long passages from these texts are devoted to various aspects
of dharma, including legal topics. In fact, many verses and passages
are more or less identical with verses and passages in the dharmnagdstras. The question of which text, in such cases, is the borrower, and
which the one borrowed from, is one that is bound to tempt Western,
or Western-trained, philologists. For the present purposes, the solution of these problems is less important than the fact that the same
legal materials that occur in the dharmagdstras,are also found in epic
and bardic literature. The later commentators were to quote from
the epics and the Purdnas, perhaps not as often as from the dharmaidstras, but definitely giving all those sources the same legal authority.

28. APASTAMBA and GAuTJAMA, in 2 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST (F.M. Muller
ed., C. Biihler trans. 1879); VASISTHA and BAUDHAYANA, in 14 THE SACRED BOOKS OF
THE EAST (F.M. Muller ed., G. Biihler trans. 1882).
29. The dates of these texts are, like the dates of most Sanskrit texts, highly uncertain. See 3 KANE, supra note 5, at xvii.
30. The most important texts of this category are attributed to Manu (200 B.C. A.D. 100), Yajiavalkya (A.D. 100-300), Visnu (A.D. 100-300) Narada (A.D. 100400), Brhaspati (A.D. 300-500), and Katyayana (A.D. 400-600). There also are numerous minor metrical dharmasastras, some of which have been preserved, often in
larger collections, whereas others are known only from quotations in later commentarial
literature. Dates are from 3 KANE, supra note 5, at xvii-xviii. See MANU, supra note
8; VISNU in 7 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST, (F.M. Muller ed., J. Jolly trans.); NXRADA
and BRHASPATI in 33 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST (J. Jolly trans. 1889); KXiTYAYANA

(Kane ed. & trans. Poona n.d.); YXJNAVALKYA (A.F. Stenzler trans., Berlin 1849).
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The beginning of this century saw the discovery, in South India,
of a manuscript of a text which had been known only through a few
indirect references. The title of the book is Arthastra,31 and it is
attributed to an author variously called Kautilya or Kautalya, and
other names, who may have been the minister of Candragupta, the
famous Maurya emperor in the third century B.C. This book exhibits a large amount of legal materials, and, especially, provides a
totally new, detailed account of Hindu administrative law. Indic
scholars have rarely been as excited as they were by the discovery
of Kautilya's Arthas'dstra,and in a short period of time a vast scholarly literature on Hindu society and law developed, based on Kautilya,
using the newly discovered book as their principle source, it being
considered superior to the well known dharmaj~istrasand allied texts.
This author shall place the Arthaidstras,as a source of law, in its correct perspective later in this Article.
Vedic Basis of Hindu Law
The dharma literature does not exist in a vacuum, according
to the Hindu tradition. On the contrary, it has a well-determined
place within a larger literary framework, with important consequences for the Hindu conception of law. First, the dharmasfitras
each belong directly to one of the branches of the Vedas. Together
with other siitras, such as the grautasiWtras, which regulate the most
elaborate ritual, the grhyasfitras, which describe the more modest
house ritual, and the sulbasitras, which are devoted to the correct
construction of the sacrificial altar, the dharmasitrasform the class of
kalpasiftras. One such kalpasitraexists in each branch of the Vedas.
Within each branch the saitras attach themselves to the earlier raztyaka, via the dratiyaka to the brdhmana, and ultimately, to the basic
samhitd. Thus, the dharmasitraattributed to Vasistha belongs to the
Rigveda, that of Gautama to the SEmaveda, and those of Apastamba
and Baudhayana to the Taittiriya branch of the Black Yajurveda.
The way in which the versified dharmaoastrasare related to Vedic
literature is less clear. An idea, first proposed by Max MUller,3 2 and
31. The text was first translated into English by R. Shamasastry in 1923, then into
German-with abundant annotations-by J.J. Meyer, in DAs ALTimrsCHE BUCH voM
WELT- tuD STAATSLEBEN (Leipzig 1926), and, most recently, into English by R.P.
Kangle (Bombay 1965).
32. A HISroRY OF A~cmNT SANsKrr LTERATURE (London 1859).
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further elaborated by Biihler 33 in the introduction to his translation
of Manu, was that the dharmas'dstrasare versified recasts of earlier
and lost prose dharmas-atras. In this way the d-tras, too, belong to
specific branches of the Vedas. The dharma dstra attributed to Manu
would then belong to the Maitrdyaniya branch of the Black Yajurveda, and that attributed to Kdtydyana to the Vdjasaneyi branch of
the White Yajurveda.
According to a different theory, the dharmakg-trascame into being at a time when Hinduism was threatened nearly simultaneously
by Buddhism and Jainism. 34 To react successfully against these
threats it was felt necessary to eliminate the differences between
schools and couch the texts in a more popular and more easily accessible form. The result was that the historical, vertical sequence of
samhitd, brdhmnwa, dratiyaka, satras,within each branch of the Vedas
was replaced with a horizontal cross sequence, each of which specialized in one particular topic across school boundaries, in castu:
dharma.
The important point here is that all the texts on dharma derive
more or less directly from the Veda. The standard phrase is vedo
dharmasya mfilam (the root of the dharma is the Veda.) Veda and
dharma are, in many ways, synonymous. This premise has important consequences for the nature of the rules on dharma and, hence,
for the Hindu conception of law. The Veda was not created by men.
It has been revealed by a number of privileged sages who subsequently transmitted it to mankind. The Revelation, (Sruti) stricto sensu,
comprehends only the samnhitds and brahmanas, and most often extends to the dranyakas, and upanisads. The various sittras, including
the dharmasitrasand dharmai&stras,technically belong to a less direct type of revelation, smriti, often translated as "tradition" to distinguish it from revelation. The epics and Purdnas also belong to
this category. This distinction, however, is unimportant for present
purposes. The main point to be remembered is that the Veda, and
therefore the dharma, and, for that reason, law, are, for the orthodox
Hindu, perfect, complete, eternal, and, above all, not to be altered
through human intervention.
33. See Introduction to MANu, supra note 8.
34. This theory was, as far as the author knows, first formulated in P. vom
Bradtke, Ueber das Manavagrhya, 38 ZEITSCHRIFT DER DEUTCHEN MORGENLXNDISCHEN
Gesellschaft 417-77 (1882).
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Comprehensiveness of Hindu Dharma and Law
In reality, the situation is far more complex than the above portrays. Even though the useful Dharmakoda "Encyclopaedia of Dharma, "3 under most headings, starts its quotations with the extracts
from the Vedas, and notwithstanding assertions that the Veda provides information of "considerable importance" on dharma,36 even a
casual observer will notice that there are hardly any rules of dharma
and even less rules of law in the ruti.
The extent to which dharma has a Vedic basis may be illustrated
with the following example. Ydjfiavalkya 37 lays down as one of the
qualifications required of an acceptable bride the necessity for her to
have a brother. Indeed, the Rigveda points, at least twice, to the
low reputation of a woman who has no brother; she is tempted to
deviate from the right path because she is unable to acquire a regular
husband. In addition, Vasistha indicates the reason why such a
woman is unacceptable as a bride: "[a] maiden who has no brothers
comes back to the male ancestors (of her own family); returning she
becomes their son." 38 The text even adds that this fact "is declared

in the Veda." 39

From the above example comes the orthodox con-

clusion that the rules of Ydjfiavalkya and Vasistha have a Vedic basis,
and that the passages from the Rigveda are illustrations of their rules
in Vedic times.
Elsewhere, at a much higher intellectual level, the tradition does
recognize that the dharma, taught by the Veda, is far from complete.
Primarily the highly sophisticated Mimhmsa, has developed a number
of fictions to account for the situation. Some of these fictions are extremely technical and scholastic.4 0 Basically, they all say that the
Veda is indeed complete, but that it has only partly been revealed to
the humans in this world.
35. L.S. Joshi ed. It lists, solely in Sanskrit, all the ancient texts, together with
extracts from commentaries, relative to specific topics of dharma. The legal section
is in three volumes (Wai 1937-1941).
36. See generally P.V. KANE, VEic BASIS OF HINDU LAW (Dharwar 1936).

37.
38.

1.52-53.
supra note 21, at 17.16.

YXJRivALKYA
VAssurA,

39. Id.
40. See generally C. SANKAEAMA
HIN'u LAw Trrs (Madras 1926).

SASTm, FICrONS IN

=HEDEvELoPMN-

OF THE
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More important for present purposes than the number of rules
of law contained in the Vedas is the fact that the earlier dharmashtras
also remain very sketchy and that they hardly pay any attention to
the legal aspects of dharma. Two different historical explanations
have been proposed. Either the legal rules had not yet been formulated at the time when the sfitras were composed, or the compilers of
these texts felt that legal prescriptions, even though they did exist,
were not important enough to be included in a more exhaustive fashion.
As time goes on, more and more legal rules appear in the texts,
far more in the dharmasidstrasthan in the siitras. Besides the dharmas of the four & ramas and the four vartas generally, more prominence is now given to the dharma of one special individual of the
ksatriya caste, namely, the king. Under the heading rdjadharma (the
king's dharma), to which Manu, for instance, devotes three full chapters, out of twelve, is found assembled a collection of prescriptions
which are essentially of a legal nature. This is not to say that law
now becomes more separated from religion and the rest; it only means
that those aspects of dharma in which western civilization's category
of law plays a more prominent role are joined together around the
central figure of the king.
Here, as elsewhere, the texts approach the subject etymologically,
that is, the king is called rja because his highest dharma is to make
his subjects happy (rafijayati). Once again, his duties are looked
upon as a contribution to maintaining the overall equilibrium. His is
the responsibility to maintain the balance between the individuals in
his kingdom. He shall protect the weak against the attacks of the
strong, lest the latter devour the former like fish in water. The molested party in a dispute (vivdda) shall have recourse directly to the
king, who sits as judge in a regular legal procedure.
At the most developed stage of the texts, this principle leads to
detailed regulations on the composition of a court of law, presided
over by the king and assisted by a varying number of Brahmins "who
are experts on dharma." This description of the court is followed by
a fourfold treatment of the proceedings. The qualifications, or lack of
them, of the plaintiff and the written plaint are followed by equally
elaborate discussions of the defendant and his plea. The third section analyzes the various types of evidence, and goes into detail on
witnesses, written evidence, possession, oaths, and ordeals. The final
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section deals, much more briefly, with the verdict, but hardly alludes
to its implementation.
In most texts the rules of procedure are set forth on the occasion
of the treatment of the first vivddapada, literally path or area of dispute. The vivddapadas are invariably eighteen in number. Manu
enumerates them as follows:
Of those (titles) the first is non-payment of debts, (then follow),
(2) deposit and pledge, (3) sale without ownership, (4) concerns
among partners, and (5) resumption of gifts, (6) [n]on-payment
of wages, (7) non-performance of agreements, (8) rescission of
sale and purchase, (9) disputes between the owner (of cattle)
and his servants, (10) [d]isputes regarding boundaries, (11) assault, (12) defamation, (13) theft, (14) robbery and violence,
(15) adultery, (16) [d]uties of man and wife, (17) partition (of
inheritance), (18) gambling and betting.41
Rather than discussing the validity of this division of substantive law,
it is important, for a proper evaluation of the system, to keep in mind
that the number eighteen appears in numerous subdivisions in India. 42
This probably means that whoever conceived the idea of eighteen
vivddapadas had the number eighteen in mind first, and only later
tried to provide eighteen titles. It also explains a later development
which first appears in Ntrada. The eighteenfold subdivision is not
abandoned but the eighteenth title becomes "Miscellaneous," which
allows authors to insert there any materials which do not find a place
in any of the other seventeen chapters.
One final remark in connection with the theory that the Veda
and Vedic dharma are comprehensive is in order. However lengthy
and detailed the later dharmagdstrasbecome in their treatment of law,
a number of serious lacunae remain. 43 A recent and carefully produced publication 44 convinced this author more than ever before how
little is known about the Hindu laws of taxation in general, and of the
laws of specific times and specific places in particular. It would be
equally difficult to draw a clear picture of the laws governing land
41. M wut, supra note 8, at 8.4-7.
42. For example, the MAHABHXRATA has eighteen books, the BHAGAVADG iTx has
eighteen chapters, and there are eighteen PURANAS.
43. These missing links were one of the reasons why the British, when they decided to apply the Sanskrit texts as the law of the land, abandoned the older dharmasistras in favor of the later and far more voluminous commentaries.
44. D. N. Jha, REvE uE SYSTEM IN POST-MAuRYA AND GuPTA TImEs (Calcutta
1967). See also Book Review, 13 Irwo-IRANsN J. 287-89 (1972).
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ownership and land tenure in classical India. The texts occasionally
refer to these topics but, for some unstated reason, they fail to go into
the same kind of details they provide for other and, from a Western
point of view, less important subjects.

Unchangeability of Hindu Dharma and Law
The claim of the tradition that dharma, including Hindu law, is
uniform and unchanging is even more complex. To be sure, the texts
display a rare and fascinating uniformity, given the fact that they
have been composed over a period of at least ten centuries and in
various parts of the vast Indian subcontinent. There are, however,
considerable differences, so much so that one might be inclined to
speak of real contradictions.
It is tempting, in cases where one text differs from another, to
explain the deviations as local or temporal variations-each text reflective of the situation in the part of India or the historical period in
which it was composed. This is no longer an adequate explanation,
however, when it is noticed that on various occassions, one and the
same text exhibits more than one solution for the same legal question.
Thus, Manu's chapter on inheritance begins with the rule: "After
the death of the father and the mother, the brothers, being assembled,
may divide among themselves in equal shares the paternal (and the
maternal) estate .... ...
The rule, however, immediately following,
unmistakably states the principle of primogeniture: "(Or) the eldest
alone may take the whole paternal estate, the others shall live under
him just as (they lived) under their father." 4" Another rule speaks
of different shares for the sons: "The additional share (deducted)
for the eldest shall be one-twentieth (of the estate) and the best
of all chattels, for the middlemost half of that, but for the youngest
one-fourth."
Another well known and often discussed example concerns
Manu's attitude toward niyoga (levirate). The text first states:
"On failure of issue (by her husband) a woman who has been author45. MANU, supra note 8, at 9.104.
46. Id. at 9.105. The "(Or)" in Biihler's translation is not present in the Sanskrit
text. Also his "may divide" and "may take" might equally have been meant to mean
"shall divide" and "shall take;" they translate the same optative forms of the verbs
as "shall live" later in the second stanza.
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ised, may obtain, (in the) proper (manner described), the desired offspring by (cohabitation with) a brother-in-law or (with some other)
Sapinda (of the husband) ." 4 The text goes on to discuss whether
one or two sons should be begotten, insists that the brother-in-law and
the widow should behave even as a father and a daughter-in-law, and
lays down the penalty for not doing so. The text then continues without any transition: "By twice-born men a widow must not be appointed to (cohabit with) any other (than her husband); for they
who appoint (her) to another (man), will violate the eternal law."48
It devotes another four stanzas4 9 to the stern repudiation of the institution of niyoga.
In addition to offering different solutions for the same problem,
the texts explicitly allow specific types of variations. On several
occasions, after a particular topic of dharma has been expounded, supplementary rules are introduced to be applicable only in cases of
dpad, which is usually translated as times of distress. The word is
never, however, clearly defined. It may, obviously, refer to general
calamities, such as floods or droughts, but it definitely also refers to
distress involving one or a few individuals. For instance, the texts
lay down strict rules on the specific occupations for each social group
(varna), but these are invariably followed by exceptions, as in Manu:
"[W]hen a Brahmin cannot live by his own activities as explained
earlier, he may live by the duties of a Ksatriya ..... 50 If he cannot
subsist as a Ksatriya, he may live as a Vaigya.5 1 These are clearly
cases of individual dpad, which must have been numerous. An individual's dharma, and the law that is applicable, depends to a large
extent on his caste. The theory of dpad, therefore, must be viewed
as an indication that the authors of the dharma texts did recognize,
to a degree, legal variation and adaptation of the law to differing
circumstances.
The theory that dharma is eternal (sandtana) and unchanging
had to be adapted to yet another concept that was very popular in
Hinduism. The Hindus, even as the ancient Greeks, and many other
civilizations, believe in the succession of four yugas (world ages),
from the best to the worst. The present time is the Kaliyuga, which
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

9.59.
9.64.
9.65-68.
10.81.
10.82.
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corresponds to the Iron Age. Dharma was perfect in the first age,
but it diminished by one fourth in each successive age, with the result that in the Kali age, dharma stands on one leg only.5 2 Consequently a number of practices described in the dharma texts have
been labeled Kalivarjyas, "practices to be avoided in the Kali age."5 3
For instance, later dharma~dstrashave used this criterion to account
for earlier contradictory statements on niyoga: levirate was a common practice in earlier ages, but it should be avoided in the Kaliyuga.
Hinduism believes, first, in the gradual deterioration within each
yuga, and, second, in the eternal return, with interruptions, of the
four ages. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that, for the orthodox
Hindu, dharma and law are, in fact, subject to continuous change.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the Sanskrit texts themselves recognize unwritten sources of dharma. One important source,
which often figures in enumerations together with gruti and smrti,
is variously calledt saddcdra (practices of the good) or si~tdcara (practices of the learned). Irrespective of the lengthy scholastic disquisitions which these terms have provoked at a later stage, it is clear
that, by introducing this type of unwritten and vaguely defined source
of law, the texts wanted to give recognition to a number of practices
which they themselves did not explicitly codify. Even more sign;ficant is the recognition by the texts, expressis verbis, of a wide variety
of more specific customs as sources of dharma. As early as Gautama's
Dharmasfitra, the king, when sitting as judge, is supposed to supplement the dharma contained in the sruti and smrti with the laws (dharma) of specific groups. Thus, it has been stated:
The laws of countries, castes, and families, which are not opposed
to the (sacred) records, (have) also authority.
Cultivators, traders, herdsmen, money-lenders, and artisans
(have authority to lay down rules) for their respective classes.
Having heard the (state of) affairs from those who (in each
class) have authority (to speak he shall give) the legal decision.51
Similar rules are repeated throughout dharma'dastra literature.
Some texts go even further and provide for separate courts of law,
which seem to be considered lower than the royal court, but at the
52.
53.
54.

Sanskrit uses the same term for "one quarter" and "a foot, a leg."
B. BHATTACHARYA, THE KALIVARJYAS (Calcutta 1943).
GArAMA 11.20-22.

HINDU CONCEPTIONS OF LAW

July 19781

same time are supposed to judge members of a group according to
rules of law current within that group. For instance, Brhaspati states:
"For persons roaming the forest, a court should be held in the forest;
for warriors, in the camp; and for merchants, in the caravan." 55
Nowhere in the texts have these specialized laws been described,
nor is there any indication of their magnitude or contents. The sole
requirement, already mentioned by Gautama and reiterated several
times in later texts, is that they not be opposed to the Veda and Vedic
dharma.

Dharmaidstrav. Legal Practice
Occasional glimpses into the existence of uncodified and unknown'
sources of law in Hinduism naturally lead to a basic question: To
what extent were the written texts on dharma true sources of law?
Do the texts actually allow an evaluation of the real attitude of Hindus
toward law?
Answers to these questions vary considerably. At one end of
the spectrum there are evaluations such as this: "There can be no
doubt that the smriti rules were concerned with the practical administration of the law."' 0 At the other end, however, there is the opinion
most forcefully expressed thus: "It is a profound error to regard
the Smritis as complete codes of law or as getting all their 'rules'
rigidly enforced by the political authorities of their times."5 7 According to the same author, "Hindu Law was in the main never more
than a pious wish of its metaphysically-minded, ceremonial-ridden
58
priestly promulgators, and but seldom a stem reality."
There have been attempts to demonstrate that the dharma texts
were indeed put to practical use in classical India, and that they do
reflect the law of the land. This author refers to an article published
under the title: "The Harmonizing of Law With the Requirements
'5
of Economic Conditions According to the Ancient Dharmagdstras."
55.

56.

B.HAsPATI 1.25.
MAYNE'S TREATISE ON HNDu LAW A"

USAGE 2 (11th ed. Madras 1950).
57. Govinda Das, The Real Character of Hindu Law, Introduction to edition of
VYAVAHARAak.LAMHATTI

58.

8 (Banaras 1914).

Id. at 16.

59. L. Sternbach, 23
528-43 (1942).
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One example mentioned in this article concerns the rate of interest.
All dharma~istrasagree on the normal rate of interest, fifteen percent.
If the debtor, however, undertakes a long and, by implication, dangerous voyage, the interest is raised to 120%, and in case of a voyage
overseas, to 200%. Although the texts reflect a logical adaptation of
the rate of interest to risk, the very fact that this adaptation is identical throughout the literature proves that the system as such was
considered more important than local or temporal differences.0 0
A more elaborate and far-reaching attempt to show the practical
use of the dharma compares the legal systems as they emerge from the
dharmag&stras of Manu, and Ydjfiavalkya, and concludes that they
reflect two very different economic and social situations. Manu represents the Hindu nation of the Brdhmanic empire (150 B.C.);
Ydjfiavalkya echoes the \prosperous and liberal Sdtavdhana empire
(A.D. 150). 6 1 A detailed analysis of these arguments would lead
this Article too far. This discussion shall therefore restrict itself to
one example, to point out the danger of the tendency to apply modern
concepts to the ancient Hindu lawbooks.
Manu distinguishes three levels of fines: the highest (1000
panas), the middlemost (500), and the lowest (250). These fines
are just one of numerous instances throughout Hindu technical literature where quantitative categories are divided into three, each one
following being half as large as the preceding one. Ydjfiavalkya
follows the same system, yet his figures are different: 1080, 540, 270.
The difference is attributed to a devaluation of the pana in the time
separating both texts. In reality, Ydjfiavalkya's sole innovation-and
a good one from the traditional point of view-is that he replaced
Manu's round figure of 1000 by 1080, a variant on the basic number
eighteen which has been met earlier in this study.
The above example probably allows, better than many others, an
understanding of the true nature of the Hindu lawbooks. On the
one hand, and most fundamental, there is the system. From the texts
that have been preserved one can, to a certain extent, follow the
60. Even Sternbach acknowledged that "from the point of view of law, the Indian
law-system can be discussed only as a static and not as a dynamic law, although there
is no doubt that the Indian law, like all other laws, has its gradual development."
Id. at 528.
61. See generally K.P. JAYASWAL, MANU AND YAJ'9AVALKYA, A COMPARISON AND
A CONTRAST (Calcutta 1930).
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development and formation of a number of specific systems. Once
a system has been established, however, it is never again altered or
abandoned. One example of the static nature of a system is the subdivision of substantive law. Once the basic scheme of eighteen titles
is introduced, no later text deviates from it. Another example is
that of the three degrees of fines. This author looks upon the compilers of the dharmandstras primarily as pandits, who worked with
a set of data which they tried-very hard, as they ought to-to arrange
within a number of acceptable systems. Some of them, totally unknown to us, succeeded in elaborating such systems. From then
onward, these systems remained unchanged. This stability is the
remarkable element in Sanskrit technical literature, and it is not restricted to law and dharna tra.
On the other hand, there is the equally typical tendency of the
Indian pandit to enrich, sophisticate, and beautify the work of his
predecessors. This tendency explains why the later dharma'astras
are far more detailed than the earlier ones. It explains why Ndrada
-more correctly, the pandit who piled the Ndradadharma'astra-further subdivided the eighteen titles of law into one hundred and thirtytwo subtitles. It also explains why Ydjfiavalkya replaced Manu's
highest fine of 1000 panas by 1080.
Many of the legal prescriptions in the dharmas'astrasmust be more
or less literal renditions of the mass of floating versified maxims which
were current in India from very early times and in many fields. When
the dharmasittrasare described as the older type of texts, it is sometimes forgotten that many of these sattras,the literary style of the time,
incorporate sections of existing maxims in Rloka meter, the style of the
later dharmaidstras. It is these maxims which were collected, ordered according to subject matter, elaborated into systems, and enriched with an ever growing number of details in the texts. The
fact that two or more maxims provided two or more different solutions
for the same problem was no obstacle to their being included in the
same texts. An example would be Manu's differing rules on the succession of an estate. It is possible that the differing maxims reflected different local usages. Too modem a view of local usages in
ancient India, however, overlooks that these usages were definitely
not the usages of North, South, East, or any other province of India.
They may, from the beginning, have coexisted within small geographic
areas. On the other hand, once they were formulated as maxims,
they must, 'together with numerous other maxims, have started on
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their intriguing and inexplicable voyage across the width and breadth
of the subcontinent.
Next to nothing is known about actual legal practice in ancient
India. The texts on dharma, as they exist today, edited, published,
and easily accessible in bookshops and libraries, were certainly not
the most wide-spread sources of law. It must be logically accepted
that those Brahmins who knew the texts must have tried also to enforce them, at least to a certain extent, whenever they were called on
for advice. It is also logical to accept that, in such cases, the ancient
Indian kings and minor executives would not normally and intentionally transgress rules of dharma,an attitude which would not only harm
them in this existence but also in later incarnations.
More important than the texts were the legal maxims referred to
earlier. These maxims, not necessarily in Sanskrit, and perhaps merely via illustrative parables, were much better known, as they are today.
To the eitent to which the maxims were applied to settle disputes,
Hindu dharma was indeed a source of law. Finally, there must have
been the whole spectrum of customs, the existence of which is, as
we have seen, confirmed by the texts. Numerous disputes must have
been solved in very definite and constant ways for the sole reason
62
that they had been solved in these ways from time immemorial.

Conclusion:

Later Developments

Until now this Article has concentrated on the classical period
of Hinduism, the time of the dharmasitras and dharmas-dstras. To
conclude, a few remarks on later developments are in order. Even
though some of the less important dharmad&strasmay have been composed at a much later period, by about the eighth century A.D.,
possibly a little earlier or later, a new period sets in in the history
of Hindu dharma. From that time onward the entire literature which
has been discussed so far becomes, for about ten centuries, the object
62. In a letter dated 1714, Father Bouchet, S.J., reported at length on the legal
system of the Hindus as he observed it. He said that they did not have written laws,
but they did have a number of well established maxims, some of which Father Bouchet
treated in detail. Also, he stated they had a wide array of customs and usages, unwritten but transmitted from parent to child, from which they would under no circumstance deviate. Bouchet assured his readers that, against all expectations, the system
worked and justice prevailed. Bouchet's description may very well apply to most situatiops in ancient India.
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of numerous and endless commentaries. A strict distinction is now
made between, on the one hand, the smrti which obtains absolute
authority, and, on the other hand, its interpretation by the commentators which is subject to continuous discussion, innovation, and improvement. Two types of commentaries should be distinguished:
(1) the commentaries stricto sensu that explain one particular text,
sTitra after sfitra, or 91oka after 9oka, comparing them with select
passages from other dharmaidstras as they proceed; and (2) the
nibandhas, often translated as digests, which treat one subject after
another, quoting and commenting on ancient texts irrespective of
their original contexts.
Opinions again vary on the role that the legal sections of the
commentaries and digests played as sources of law. Most modem
scholars, Western first, Indian later, believe that the commentators
used the ancient texts actually to codify the laws of their respective
provinces. The most recent study of classical Hindu law"s even
equates the transition from sdstra to commentary with the passage
"from dharma to law."64

This author has consistently defended a very different interpretation of the commentarial period of dharma literature. The commentaries stricto sensu do not in any wpay attach greater importance
to the legal sections of the ancient texts than they do to any other section of the dharma, nor do they treat them in any different way. The
commentarial technique is identical throughout. In the digests there
are now separate sections on vivdda, substantive law, vyavahdra,
either procedure or procedure and substantive law, and niti, administrative law. Once again, however, these legal sections are not more
important nor are they in any way different from the many other sections which, together with them, make up the nibandha. The basic
misunderstanding of these texts, and a total loss of historical perspective, came about during the colonial period, when the legal sections
of the commentaries and digests were edited, translated into English,
and used as lawbooks, whereas all other sections were left to be studied by historians of religion or totally neglected.
In this author's opinion the Hindu attitude toward law in these
Indian Middle Ages was not different from what it had been in more
63. R. LINGAT, LES SOURCES
(J.D.M. Derrett trans. 1973).
64. Id. at 143.
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ancient times. In principle, the .4&tra was still the theoretical source
of law. In practice, maxims and customs were paramount. There
was one difference, though. In many parts of India where the Moghul Empire was strong, Muslim law took over from Hindu law, also
for Hindus. Some of this author's recent research seems to indicate
that in certain areas Hindu law had, for all practical purposes, disappeared at the time when the colonial powers appeared on the scene.
As indicated at the beginning of this Article, in 1772 the British.
under the impulse of Governor General Warren Hastings, decided
that, in a number of areas of private law, Hindus should be governed
by their own laws. The answer to the question where these laws
might be found, was predictable: the idstra. The British interpreted this answer literally and elevated, for the first time in Indian
history, the dharmaidstrasqua texts to the rank of lawbooks. British
judges were given the task of applying laws in the courts, the extent
of which they did not know, the language of which they were unable
to read, and the general background of which they could not understand. For several years, pandits were appointed to the courts to
research the laws governing each case. Dissatisfaction with the
system and distrust of the pandits led Sir William Jones to study Sanskrit and translate Manu's dharma.Ostra. The need to have a complete
code of Hindu law led to the compilation, by hired pandits, of new
digests, which were subsequently translated into English. The
vagueness of these codes in turn created the concept of schools of
Hindu law based on the premise, wrong in this author's opinion, that
the medieval digests codified the laws of different provinces of India,
and that they could be used as such. In short, a slowly growing
number of legal sections of commentaries and digests were translated
into English, and the British judges applied them, as well as they
could, even against occasional odds. For instance, when a party or
a lawyer presented the judge with a Sanskrit text which had not yet
been translated, it should not therefore be less authoritative. Inevitably, the judges introduced a few changes of their own. They
arbitrarily separated law from religion. The commentaries were, relatively speaking, the least ambiguous sources of law, therefore the
judges reversed the traditional hierarchy, and stated that the wording
of the commentary overrules that of the dharmaidstra,and the latter
that of the Vedas. They gradually avoided consulting and reinterpreting the translations of Sanskrit texts by making Hindu law into a
regular case law, invoking precedent and stare decisis. When the
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Hindu lawbooks appeared to be unacceptable, they overruled them
on the grounds of justice, equity, and good conscience.
This description would be irrelevant for the study of Hindu conceptions of law, were it not that the Hindu judges, Hindu attorneys,
and the Hindu public at large fully accepted this well-intended but
perfectly hybrid system of law created by the British. They accepted it before independence, and they continued to live by it after
1947.
In the meanwhile, a number of basically Western codes had
been introduced: the Penal Code (1860); the Indian Evidence Act
(1872); the Criminal Procedure Code (1898); and the Code of Civil
Procedure (1908). For more than a century, in the field of _private
law, several legislative Acts overruled and abrogated more and more
provisions of classical Hindu law. In the years before independence,
a serious effort was made to codify Hindu private law. The "Hindu
Code Bill," however, never became law, in view of the lack of agreement, even among Indians, on the basic principles upon which private laws applicable to all Hindus should be built. The Indian Constitution was even more ambitious: "The State shall endeavour to
secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory.
of India."65 Today, nearly three decades later, there is no evidence
to show that this ideal will be realized in the near future.
65.

INDMAN CONSTIrUTION, art. 44 (1950).

